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Abstract. A statistical analysis of financial, economic, and demographic indicators performed by 
the authors demonstrates (1) that the main countries of East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, and 
Tanzania) have not escaped the Malthusian Trap yet; (2) that this countries are not likely to 
follow the “North African path” and to achieve this escape before they achieve serious successes 
in their fertility transition; (3) that East Africa is unlikely to achieve this escape if it does not 
follow the “Bangladeshi path” and does not achieve really substantial fertility declines in the 
foreseeable future, which would imply the introduction of compulsory universal secondary 
education, serious family planning programs of the Rwandan type, and the rise of legal age of 
marriage with parental consent. Such measures should of course be accompanied by the 
substantial increases in the agricultural labor productivity and the decline of the percentage of 
population employed in agriculture.  
 
The Malthusian trap
1
 is a rather typical for pre-industrial societies situation when the growth of 
output (as it is accompanied by a faster demographic growth) does not lead in the long-range 
perspective to the increase in per capita output and the improvement of living conditions of the 
majority of population that remains close to the bare survival level (see, e.g., Malthus, 1978 
[1798]; Artzrouni & Komlos, 1985; Steinmann & Komlos, 1988; Komlos & Artzrouni, 1990; 
Steinmann, Prskawetz, & Feichtinger 1998; Wood, 1998; Kögel & Prskawetz, 2001; Korotayev, 
Malkov, & Khaltourina, 2006b; Korotayev & Khaltourina, 2006; Clark, 2007; Conley, McCord, 
& Sachs 2007; Korotayev et al., 2011).  
In complex pre-industrial societies the Malthusian trap was one of the main generators of state 
breakdowns and sociopolitical collapses frequently resulted in millions of deaths (see, e.g., 
Korotayev & Khaltourina, 2006; Korotayev, Malkov, & Khaltourina, 2006b; Chu & Lee, 1994; 
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 Using the terminology of non-linear dynamics one can also denote it as the low-level equilibrium attractor (ср. 
Nelson, 1956).  
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Nefedov, 2004; Turchin, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Turchin & Korotayev, 2006; Turchin & Nefedov, 
2009; Usher, 1989; van Kessel-Hagesteijn, 2009; Korotayev et al., 2011; for a recent case in East 
Africa see André & Platteau 1998)2. 
The global modernization, and first of all the increase in per capita productivity due to major 
technological advances in the recent centuries in conjunction with demographic transition 
secured the systematic excess of output growth rates over population growth rates, which 
allowed most social systems to escape the Malthusian trap (see, e.g., Artzrouni & Komlos, 1985; 
Lucas, 1998; Galor & Weil, 1999; Kögel & Prskawetz 2001; Korotayev, Malkov, & Khaltourina, 
2006a; Pereira, 2006).  
However, these modernization processes started later in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of 
the world; and even in the recent decades the Malthusian trap tended to produce state 
breakdowns in this region (see, e.g., André & Platteau 1998). What is more, some parts of 
Tropical Africa (and, first of all, East Africa) appear to be trapped in the Malthusian Trap till 
now (though contrary views continue to be expressed [see first of all Kenny, 2010]). This looks 
especially salient if we compare the long term per capita food consumption dynamics in North 
Africa, on the one hand, and the three main countries of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda), on the other (see Fig. 1):    
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 Note that Malthus himself considered warfare (including, naturally, internal warfare) as one of the most important 
results of overpopulation (in addition to epidemics and famines). What is more, he regarded wars, epidemics, and 
famines as so-called “positive checks” that checked overpopulation in pre-industrial systems (Malthus 1978 
[1798]). Thus, in pre-industrial societies bloody political upheavals frequently turned out to be a result of the 
respective social systems being caught in the Malthusian trap.  
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Fig. 1.  Average per capita food consumption dynamics (kcal per capita per day)  
in North and East Africa, 1961-2009  
 
 
Data source: FAO 2013.  
 
The WHO recommended norm of per capita is generally between 2300 and 2400 kcal/person/day 
(Naiken 2002), whereas 2100 is considered to be the minimum daily requirement (Joint 
FAO/WHO/UNU Expert Consultation 1985; FAO 2009: 24). Note also that according to Clark 
(2007) the average per capita calorie intake of about 2300 kcal/person/day or less is typical for 
those social systems that have not escaped the Malthusian Trap – such a level was observed, for 
example, in England and Belgium around 1800 (that is just before those countries started their 
escape from the Malthusian Trap – 2322 for Britain in 1787–1796 and 2248 for Belgium in 1812 
[Clark 2007: 50]). Thus all the countries of North and East Africa appear to have still been in the 
early 1960s in the Malthusian Trap with the majority of their population remaining close to the 
bare survival level and had serious malnutrition problems. The situation was particularly bad in 
Libya, Tanzania, and Algeria, where the average per capita food consumption was even below 
the minimum daily requirement level; it was somehow better in Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia
3
. However, it could hardly be called problem-free. The average per capita 
food consumption was still below the recommended and it was too close to the minimum daily 
requirement – which implied that a very substantial proportion of the population consumed 
below this level
4
.  
 However, in the 1970-s – early 1980s all the countries of North Africa escaped rather 
successfully the Malthusian Trap and now these countries struggle more against overeating 
problems rather than with problems of undernourishment
5
.  
                                                          
3
 Note that in the two East African countries of this group the situation was even better than in the North African 
countries.  
4
 Note that all the countries that have firmly escaped the Malthusian Trap reached the level significantly higher than 
2400 kcal/capita/day.  
5
 For example, percentage of the obese among the modern Egyptians is one of the highest in the world (e.g., 
Martorell et al. 2000; Korotayev, Zinkina 2011). According to Egyptian Demographic and Health Survey 
(conducted in 2008) 40% of Egyptian women and 18% of men were overweight because of overeating (Egypt 
Ministry of Health et al. 2009). According to a bit more recent data, this figures equal 22% for males and 48% for 
females (Badran, Laher 2011: 3).  
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 This escape was accomplished first of all due to the fact that in this period all the countries of 
this region managed to achieve very high GDP growth rates that exceeded significantly the 
population growth rates, which resulted in very substantial increases in per capita GDP
6
 (see 
Fig. 2):  
 
Fig. 2. Relative Dynamics of Population, GDP, and GDP per capita  
in North African Countries during Their Escape from the Malthusian Trap  
 
Algeria, 1971-1985 (100 = 1971 level) Egypt, 1971-1985 (100 = 1971 level) 
 
  
Morocco, 1971-1985 (100 = 1971 level) Tunisia, 1971-1985 (100 = 1971 level) 
 
  
Libya, 1960-1970 (100 = 1960 level) 
 
Data source: Maddison 2010.  
 
This escape was further supported by the decrease of the fertility rates (see Fig. 3):  
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 Note that Libya made the respective breakthrough a bit earlier, in the 1960s.  
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Fig. 3.  Dynamics of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR, births per woman)  
in North and East Africa (1960–2011)  
 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: SP.DYN.TFRT.IN.  
 
As we see, in this respect, North Africa also stands in sharp contrast with East Africa, where the 
total fertility rate remains very high till now.  
Of course, in recent decades the TFR somehow declined in East Africa too, but the extent 
of this decrease was rather small, and it was mostly compensated by the decrease of the death 
rate (which was interrupted somehow by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, but resumed with its 
decline
7
). As a result, in a contrast with North Africa which observed a very significant decline 
of the population growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s, East African population growth rates 
remained mostly at such levels that were typical for North African countries before the start of 
the fertility decline in this part of the world (see Fig. 4):  
 
  
                                                          
7
 See, e.g., World Bank 2013: SP.DYN.LE00.IN, SP.DYN.IMRT.IN, SH.DYN.MORT, SP.DYN.CDRT.IN; 
Ngallaba et al. 1993: 71–78; Bureau of Statistics [Tanzania] and Macro International Inc. 1997: 97–104; Opiyo, 
Omolo, Imbwaga 2010; National Bureau of Statistics [Tanzania] 2000: 85–92; 2005: 123–130; 2011: 117–126; 
Kaijuka et al. 1989: 53–66; Statistics Department [Uganda] and Macro International Inc. 1996: 97–104; Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics 2001: 97–108; 2007: 109–118; 2012: 98–104; National Council for Population and 
Development et al. 1989: 55–72; 1994: 83–92; Kichamu 1999; Muindi, Bicego 1999; Bicego, Kichamu 1999; 
Otieno, Omolo 2004; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2010: 103–112.  
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Fig. 4.  Population Growth Rates (annual %)  
in North and East Africa (1960–2011)  
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: SP.POP.GROW.  
 
It appears important to note that the escape from the Malthusian Trap was accompanied in North 
Africa by a fast increase of the productivity of labor in agriculture (see Fig. 5):  
 
 
Fig. 5.  Dynamics of Labor Productivity in Agriculture (constant 2000 dollars per 
worker) in North and East Africa (1961–2011)  
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: EA.PRD.AGRI.KD.  
 
Quite predictably this was also accompanied by a sharp decline of percentage of economically 
active people employed in agriculture and now it constitutes 28.2% in Egypt, 17.7% in Tunisia, 
and 11.7% in Algeria (World Bank 2013: SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS)
8
.  
 
East Africa stands here in a sharp contrast. The most clear Malthusian economic-demographic 
dynamics is observed in the recent decades in Kenya (see Fig. 6):  
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 There is no direct data on this variable for North African countries in the early 1960s, but one may take into 
account the point that in 1960 the rural population constituted about two thirds of the overall population in those 
countries (UN Population Division 2012).  
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Fig. 6. Relative Dynamics of Population, GDP, and GDP per capita  
in Kenya, 1980–2009 (100 = 1980 level)  
 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: SP.POP.TOTL, NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD.  
 
As we see, between 1980 and 2009 the Kenyan economy grew rather substantially, by about 
150%. But the Kenyan population in those years grew as substantially – and, as a result, per 
capita GDP in Kenya in 2009 was almost the same as in 1980.  
 However, the situation in Uganda and Tanzania does not appear as simple. In both countries 
in recent years one could observe a rather substantial growth of per capita GDP (see Fig. 7):  
 
Fig. 7. GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international $) dynamics in 
Tanzania and Uganda, 1994–2011  
 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD  
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Why was not this converted in the growth of the per capita food consumption? It appears very 
important to answer this question, as the positive values of per capita GDP growth rates observed 
recently in most countries of Tropical Africa have made some experts believe that “(almost) the 
whole World – including most IF NOT ALL of Africa – shares features of Malthus’ vision for 
escaping the trap he outlined” (Kenny 2010: 192, our emphasis).  
 To answer this question it appears necessary to consider the recent economic growth in East 
Africa by sector. Let us start with the dynamics of production of services in Uganda (see Fig. 8):  
 
Fig. 8. Relative Dynamics of Population, Services Production, and Services 
Production per capita in Uganda, 1994–2011 (100 = 1994 level)  
 
 
 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: NV.SRV.TETC.KD, SP.POP.TOTL; the services production index was calculated 
on the basis of the World Development Indicator NV.SRV.TETC.KD: “Services, value added (constant 2000 
US$)”.  
 
As we see, in these years Ugandan successes in this sector of its economy were really 
spectacular. Between 1994 and 2011 Ugandan population almost doubled. But growth rates in 
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the service sector by far outpaced the population growth rate – production in this sector 
quadrupled, and per capita production of services increased more than twice.  
 Successes of industrial development in Uganda in these years were even more spectacular – 
between 1994 and 2011 industrial output grew in this country five times (see Fig. 9): 
 
Fig. 9. Relative Dynamics of Population, Industrial Production, and Industrial 
Production per capita in Uganda, 1994–2011 (100 = 1994 level)  
 
 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: NV.IND.TOTL.KD, SP.POP.TOTL; the industrial production index was calculated 
on the basis of the World Development Indicator NV.IND.TOTL.KD: “Industry, value added (constant 2000 US$)”. 
 
But what about the sector where the majority of the Ugandan working population is still 
employed? Unfortunately, the situation in this sector is strikingly different from the success 
stories of the Ugandan non-agricultural enterprises (see Fig. 10):  
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Fig. 10. Relative Dynamics of Population, Agricultural Production, and Agricultural 
Production per capita in Uganda, 1994–2011 (100 = 1994 level)  
 
 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: NV.AGR.TOTL.KD, SP.POP.TOTL; the agricultural production index was 
calculated on the basis of the World Development Indicator NV.AGR.TOTL.KD: “Agriculture, value added 
(constant 2000 US$)”. 
 
As we see, between 1994 and 2011 the growth of agricultural production in Uganda was still 
quite substantial (60%). But the population growth in Uganda in those years was even higher. 
And as a result the agricultural production per capita in Uganda declined. Note that this 
correlates rather well with the data on almost perfect stagnation of the agricultural labor 
productivity in Uganda in the recent years
9
 (see above Fig. 5).  
 Actually one of the most important differences between contemporary North and East Africa 
is that in North Africa a rather small proportion of population is employed in agriculture, 
whereas in East Africa this is the overwhelming majority of the population (see Fig. 11):   
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 For some peculiarities of Tanzanian case see Appendix 1. On the phenomenon of the agricultural growth rate 
lagging behind the overall economic growth rate in Uganda see, e.g., Deininger, Okidi 2001: 124–125.  
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Fig. 11. Employment in agriculture, %, in North and East Africa in the 2000s  
 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS.  
 
Hence, the majority of the population of the East African countries will remain in the Malthusian 
Trap even against the background of an overall growth of GDP per capita if this growth is 
achieved through the productivity growth in non-agricultural sectors only with the agricultural 
labor productivity of the majority of rural population stagnating or declining.  
Hence, a sustainable escape from the Malthusian trap can hardly be achieved in East 
Africa without a substantial increase in the productivity of labor of the majority of agricultural 
population. However, one of the main obstacles for this is just the rural overpopulation 
effectively blocking such increases.  
 As Roth and Fratkin (2005: 6) note, in East Africa “rapid population growth has affected rural 
and urban areas, where farmers increasingly move onto less productive lands to raise their crops 
and families”. Population pressure leads to the reduction of the fallow periods10, as a result of 
which the soil fertility fails to restore to original levels, as a result frequently various innovations 
(like fertilizers) just allow to prevent (at least partly) the decline of the current low agricultural 
labor productivity instead of increasing it (see, e.g., Bigsten, Kayizzi-Mugarewa 1999: 80).  
Hence, the countries of East Africa will hardly be able to achieve a sustainable escape from 
the Malthusian Trap before they achieve a serious fertility decline.  
 However, why could not East Africa follow the “North African” path – that is, achieving the 
escape from the Malthusian Trap first, and accomplishing the fertility decline second?  
One point is that North Africa escaped from the Malthusian Trap just 1–2 decades after the 
population growth rates exceeded 2.5% per year levels (implying the population doubling just 
within 30 years), whereas in East Africa such a growth continues for many decades and with any 
new decade the escape from the Malthusian Trap before the fertility decline becomes less and 
less likely.  
                                                          
10
 Those analysts who deny the presence of overpopulation problems in Tropical Africa love to say things like “only 
12% of all potential arable land is under cultivation [in Sub Saharan Africa]” (Hayes 2012: 114); however, they tend 
not to take into consideration the point that “new” land being brought under cultivation in Tropical Africa under 
population pressure in most cases is not virgin, but it is rather fallow land whose straightforward cultivation leads to 
the reduction of fallow periods, inadequate soil fertility restoration, soil degradation, and decrease of labor 
productivity, whereas against such a background serious efforts should be taken even in order just to retain the 
agricultural labor productivity at old level. E.g., “Blackie et al. (1998) observed that because of increasing 
population density and declining land availability ‘maize is now grown in continuous cultivation rather than as part 
of a fallow [rotation] which traditionally used to restore soil fertility and reduce the build up of pests and diseases. 
The soil resource base is now being degraded with a consequent reduction of yield’ ” (Barahona, Cromwell 2005: 
159).   
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But, if there are such successes in urban sectors, why just not to move the majority of 
population from stagnant villages to vibrant cities?  
 To answer this question it makes sense to consider the urban population dynamics in North 
and East Africa (see Fig. 12):  
 
Fig. 12. Percentage of Urban Population in North and East Africa, 1970–201011 
 
 
Data source: UN Population Division 2012.  
 
As we see, even now the proportion of urban population in East Africa is substantially lower 
than it was in North Africa at the start of its escape from the Malthusian Trap. And if the recent 
urban population percentage growth rate, say, in Uganda continues, this country will only reach 
the 1970 level of the least urbanized North African country, Morocco, in the late 2050s.   
 It appears also relevant to consider the recent UN population division medium projections for 
the three main countries of East Africa. Note that those projections are based on the assumption 
that the fertility decline in East Africa will accelerate in the forthcoming decades (see Fig. 13):  
  
                                                          
11
 This diagram does not display the curve for Egypt, as the official Egyptian data on the variable in question 
(reproduced by the World Urbanization Prospects) appear irrelevant due to the huge underestimation of the actual 
numbers of urban population by the official Egyptian statistics in the recent years: “Though according to 
government statistics Egypt remains a largely rural country, many villages have expanded, some to over 100,000 
inhabitants, but have not been reclassified as towns… The population of a medium-sized Egyptian ‘village’ [is in the 
range] 10,000 to 10,500 people; naturally, as there are villages with much less population, there invariably exist 
villages with much greater populations. According to global standards, these ‘villages’ with more than 10,000 
dwellers ought to be classified as small towns (which would account for a prevalence of non-agricultural 
employment [in these settlements]), but… in this respect Egyptian statistics failed to keep pace with the rate of 
village population growth, and reclassification [of those ‘villages’ into ‘towns’] is yet to be expected” (Zinkina, 
Korotayev 2013: 34–35).   
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Fig. 13. UN Population Division projections of TFR (births per woman) 
dynamics in East Africa underlying their medium population forecast for the 
main East African countries  
 
 
Data source: UN Population Division 2013.  
 
Still these projections forecast the following population dynamics for East Africa (see Fig. 14):  
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Fig. 14. UN Population Division medium population forecast for the main 
East African countries, millions  
 
 
 
 
Note: black dotted line presents the current population of Russia for comparison. Data source: UN Population 
Division 2013.  
 
As we see, even with the acceleration of fertility decline forecasted by the UN Population 
Division, the population of Kenya and Uganda will exceed the population of Russia in the 
second half of the century. Tanzania will reach Russia in terms of population by 2050 and is 
projected to have twice the Russian population by 2100. And Tanzania is almost bound to have 
population of Russia, as, according to the estimates of the UN Population Division (2013), the 
number of children below 5 in Tanzania is already almost the same as in Russia.  
 Note that without more substantial fertility declines (which would imply the introduction of 
compulsory universal secondary education, serious family planning programs of the Rwandan 
type [see, e.g., Kinzer 2007; WHO 2008; Lu et al. 2012]), and the rise of legal age of marriage 
with parental consent) East Africa is likely to face two options, if it would like to escape the 
Malthusian Trap:  
 
1) to move no less than 50% of its rural populations to dynamically growing urban sectors 
(that is, to increase the urban population proportion growth rate substantially in comparison with 
what was observed in recent years [see Fig. 12]). Note that, in conjunction with the UN 
Population Division projections this would imply the growth of the urban population if East 
Africa by about 80 million people by 2050 and by c. 160 million people by the end of this 
century. This would be tantamount to the creation in a few forthcoming decades in East Africa of 
about 80 new cities of the size of Koeln. Most likely such a scenario would rather produce an 
explosive growth of slums, urban overpopulation, social explosions and so on (cf. Korotayev et 
al. 2011).  
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2) On the other hand, if in East Africa the current trend of the urban population percentage 
growth continues, this would imply that the rural population of East Africa (Tanzania + Kenya + 
Uganda) would be five timesconsiderable fertility decline. Hence, it appears that it has lost the 
moment when it could follow the “North African” model of the escape from the Malthusian 
Trap. Note also that in the most important country of North Africa, in Egypt, the escape from the 
Malthusian Trap did not lead to fertility decline automatically, but it demanded a rather 
considerable family planning effort.  
Mubarak’s administration was well aware of the threat hidden in the growing gap between 
declining death rate and stably high birth rate, and almost since the beginning of Mubarak’s 
reign (1981) it started taking measures aimed at bringing down the birth rate (see, e.g., Fargues 
1997: 117–118). However, only in the second half of the 1980s the government managed to 
develop a really efficient program of such measures. This program was performed by the 
Egyptian government in collaboration with USAID program aimed at wide-scale introduction 
and distribution of family planning (Moreland 2006). Religious leaders (from al-Azhar sheikhs to 
local imams) were involved in the program to disseminate (in their fatwahs and sermons) the 
idea that family planning was not adverse to al-Qur’an; on the contrary, it is good, as having less 
children makes it easier for the parents to give them a happy childhood and good education (Ali 
1997). This strategy proved essentially effective, as during 5 years (1988–1992) total fertility 
rate in Egypt fell from 5 to 4 children per woman. 
One may wonder if East Africa should not rather follow now the “Bangladeshi scenario”. In 
Bangladesh the fertility decline PRECEEDED the start of successful development.  
Successful development only started when in the 1990s Bangladeshi TFR fell below 4 
children per woman level (due to implementation of rather effective family planning programs 
[see, e.g., ). Before that Bangladesh rather followed the “East African path” – very fast 
population growth “ate” almost all the (rather substantial) GDP growth that took place in 
Bangladesh. Note that though Bangladeshi GDP grew between 1970 and 1995 (i.e. in 25 year 
period) more than twice; however, the per capita GDP remained almost the same. By contrast, 
after Bangladesh had managed to bring TFR below 4, the per capita GDP in this country 
increased in 15 years by about 100% (see Figs. 15 and 16):  
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Fig. 15. TFR Dynamics in Bangladesh (1960–2010) 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: SP.DYN.TFRT.IN.  
 
Fig. 16. Relative Dynamics of Population, GDP, and GDP per capita  
in Bangladesh, 1970–2008 (100 = 1970 level)  
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: SP.POP.TOTL, NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD.  
 
Still there was an appreciable (albeit very slow) growth of per capita GDP in Bangladesh in 
1980–1995. However, this growth failed to be translated into a significant improvement of the 
life of the majority of the Bangladeshi population, which is evidenced by the dynamics of 
average food consumption that remained during this period at a very low level that is typical for 
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Tropical African countries trapped in the Malthusian trap and did not exhibit any tendency to 
increase (that is also rather characteristic for this type of countries) (see Fig. 17):  
Fig. 17.  Average per capita food consumption dynamics (kcal per capita per day)  
in Bangladesh, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (1980–1995) 
 
Data source: FAO 2013.  
Thus, when fertility in Bangldeshi remained close to Tropical African levels (see Fig. 18 below), 
average per capita food consumption levels also remained extremely close to Tropical African 
ones (see Fig. 17 above).  
Fig. 18. TFR dynamics in Bangladesh, Kenya, Iran, Uganda, and Tazania (1980-1995) 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: SP.DYN.TFRT.IN.  
But why did in 1980–1995 the average per capita food consumption in Bangladesh stall against 
the background of quite visible growth of per capita GDP in those years. The point is that this 
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economy – in industry, construction, transportation, trade, financial sector, and so on. However, 
one should take into account that at that time a rather small minority of Bangladeshi population 
lived in the cities (the same was true for the East African countries as well [see Fig. 19]) – note 
that the overwhelming majority of population is still rural both in Bangladesh and in Tropical 
African countries in question (see Fig. 20):  
Fig. 19. Urban population (% of total) in Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Kenya in 1995 
 
Data source: UN Population Division 2012.  
Fig. 20. Dynamics of urban population (% of total) in Bangladesh and East Africa,  1960-
2010 
 
Data source: UN Population Division 2012.  
Against this background it is highly important to notice that in 1980–1995 one could observe a 
stall of the productivity of labor in agriculture – it was not only very low (quite comparable with 
its contemporary levels in Tropical African countries still trapped in the Malthusian trap); what 
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growth of productivity of agricultural labor during this period was blocked by explosive rural 
overpopulation was the main cause of the stall in the growth of the average per capita food 
consumption (see Fig. 21):  
Fig. 21. Labor productivity in agriculture (value added per worker per year, constant 2000 dollars) in 
Bangladesh and East Africa, 1980-1995 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: EA.PRD.AGRI.KD.  
 
The overall picture of relative dynamics in Bangladesh in the period before it achieved 
substantial decline in fertility levels looks as follows (Fig. 22):  
Fig. 22. Dynamics of GDP per capita, agricultural labor productivity, and average per capita food 
concumption in Bangladesh (1980-1995, 100 = 1980 level) 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: EA.PRD.AGRI.KD, SP.POP.TOTL, NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD; FAO 2013.  
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As we see against the background of huge population pressure even quite noticeable per capita 
GDP growth failed to get translated into a comparatively noticeable growth of agricultural labor 
productivity, which (within the context of the overwhelming majority of population still being 
rural) resulted in the absence of any noticeable improvement in the average per capita food 
consumption at all.  
Note that in some East African countries such a dynamics is observed till now. For example, for 
Uganda it looks as follows (Fig. 23):  
Fig. 23. Dynamics of GDP per capita, agricultural labor productivity, and average per capita food 
concumption in Uganda (1990-2009, 100 = 1990 level) 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: EA.PRD.AGRI.KD, SP.POP.TOTL, NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD; FAO 2013.  
 
As we see the pattern which is observed till now in Uganda is almost identical with the one 
which had been observed in Bangladesh before this country managed to achieve a really 
substantial fertility decline – quite a noticeable per capita GDP growth fails to get translated into 
a comparatively noticeable growth of agricultural labor productivity, which (within the context 
of the overwhelming majority of population still being rural) results in the absence of any 
noticeable improvement in the average per capita food consumption at all.
12
 This demonstrates 
again that we should not expect that the comprehensive development will “automatically” bring 
about all the necessary fertility declines (this belief seems to be analogous to the famous belief of 
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 Note that this is not the worst possible scenario for the present-day Tropical Africa (at least in recent decades we 
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some economists that the “invisible hand of market” will sort everything out automatically). The 
situation is just opposite in the countries trapped in the Malthusian trap (which is the case for the 
most of the present-day Tropical African countries) – in those countries the achievement of the 
substantial fertility decline is a precondition of successful comprehensive development.  
Bangladesh managed to get in the trajectory of really successful comprehensive development 
only after by the mid-1990s it had managed to achieve a really substantial fertility decline (see 
Fig. 24):  
Fig. 24. Dynamics of agricultural labor productivity, and average per capita food 
concumption in Bangladesh (1980-2009, 100 = 1980 level) 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: EA.PRD.AGRI.KD; FAO 2013.  
 
Only after that Bangladesh started its way out of the Malthusian trap. Only after that it managed 
to outstrip its Tropical African analogues (that failed to achieve similar fertility declines and that, 
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Fig. 25. Labor productivity in agriculture (value added per worker per year, constant 2000 dollars) in 
Bangladesh and East Africa, 1995-2010 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: EA.PRD.AGRI.KD.  
 
Fig. 26. Average per capita food consumption dynamics (kcal per capita per day) in 
Bangladesh, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda 1990-2009 
 
Data source: World Bank 2013: EA.PRD.AGRI.KD; FAO 2013.  
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Thus, the similarity of Bangladeshi pattern to the situation in modern East African countries is 
striking. This demonstrates again that we should not expect that the comprehensive development 
will “automatically” bring about all the necessary fertility declines. The situation is just opposite 
in the countries trapped in the Malthusian trap (which used to be the case for Bangladesh and 
still is the case for the most of the present-day Tropical African countries) – in those countries 
the achievement of substantial fertility decline is a precondition of successful comprehensive 
development. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Thus there are grounds to maintain:  
 
1) that the main countries of East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania) have not escaped 
the Malthusian Trap yet;  
2) that this countries are not likely to follow the “North African path” and to achieve this 
escape before they achieve serious successes in their fertility transition;  
3) that East Africa is unlikely to achieve this escape if it does not follow the “Bangladeshi 
path” and does not achieve really substantial fertility declines in the foreseeable future, 
which would imply the introduction of compulsory universal secondary education, 
serious family planning programs of the Rwandan type, and the rise of legal age of 
marriage with parental consent. Such measures should of course be accompanied by the 
substantial increases in the agricultural labor productivity and the decline of the 
percentage of population employed in agriculture.  
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Appendix 1. Tanzanian case  
 
Tanzania constitutes a rather special case, as the stagnation of per capita food consumption was 
observed in this country against the background of not only the GDP per capita growth, but also 
some growth of labor productivity in agriculture (see Fig. 5 above). This seems to be accounted 
for by the point that in Tanzania recent years evidenced a rapid growth of production of such 
agricultural products as tea (see Fig. 1.1) or tobacco
13
 (see Fig. 1.2) where production take place 
to a considerable extent at larger agricultural enterprises, whereas the production of such staple 
foods as cassava (see Fig. 1.3), where the majority of agricultural population is concentrated, 
stagnated or even declined.  
 
Fig. 1.1. Dynamics of tea production in Tanzania (tons)  
 
 
Data source: FAO, 2014.  
 
                                                          
13
 On the recent success story in the Tanzanian tobacco cultivation see in particular Mitchell & Baregu, 2012.  
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Fig. 1.2. Dynamics of unmanufactured tobacco production in Tanzania (tons)  
 
 
Data source: FAO, 2014.  
 
Fig. 1.3. Dynamics of cassava production in Tanzania (tons)  
 
 
Data source: FAO, 2014.  
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